DP15137定价组成员

• 安东尼奥•卡布拉尔悉达多Bandyopadhyay
2020年8月6日

我们考虑的模型中,代理有不同的“类型”,决定了他们对一个公益自愿贡献。我们分析的平衡组成团体集中和集中下的选择。我们表明,存在一个自顶向下排序均衡即均存在一组价格导致团体可以通过级别的命令类型,与第k类型组中最高的价格等等。这存在下分散和集中的选择。We also analyze the model with endogenous group size and examine under what conditions is top-down sorting socially ecient. We illustrate when integration (i.e. mixing types so that each group's average type if the same) is socially better than top-down sorting. Finally, we show that top down sorting is efficient even when groups compete among themselves.