讨论文件
DP12836支付本地监控性能?福利分析在乌干达小学老师出席
达到激励代理人的双重目标性能和提供信息为达成计划的目的,公共部门组织往往依赖于昂贵的验证由当地监控报告。获得智慧,附加fi财政激励措施,这些报告将导致勾结,并削弱这两个目标。然而,简单的讨价还价的逻辑表明,相反:支付本地监控性能可以鼓励所期望的行为和改进信息。探讨这个问题,我们进行了一项随机对照试验在乌干达小学,探索了如何设计激励教师由校长基于局部监测。实验随机变化头教师老师出席的报告是否与教师奖金。We find that local monitoring on its own is ineff ective at improving teacher attendance. However, combining local monitoring with fi nancial incentives leads to both an increase in teacher attendance (by 8 percentage points) and an improvement in the quality of information. We also observe substantial gains in pupil attainment, driven primarily by a reduction in dropouts. By placing a fi nancial value on these enrollment gains, we demonstrate that pay for locally monitored performance passes both welfare and fi scal sustainability tests.
£6.00
